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Motivating Cosmopolitanism and the 
Responsibility for the Health of Others 




Abstract and Keywords 
Cosmopolitanism has often been criticized for being unable to overcome a ‘motivational problem’ of 
moving moral theory to political practice. This chapter responds to this criticism by exploring a state-
based and more politically motivated form of cosmopolitanism. In doing so this chapter re-examines 
whether a cosmopolitan condition must necessarily derive its normativity from an explicit 
cosmopolitan moral foundation of ‘humanity’ alone, further arguing that it is possible to locate three 
conditions available to advance a motivation based ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’ that sits between 
state self-interest and a movement towards a cosmopolitan condition. In order to better connect 
theory to practice, the chapter examines recent normative and institutional shifts in global health 
policy and the growing recognition by powerful states that national health security and the health of 
those beyond borders are intimately linked and co-constituted. 
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Introduction 
Cosmopolitanism has struggled to respond to a number of criticisms about its inability to move from 
theory to practice. Of these criticisms three remain particularly challenging. First, despite a post-Cold 
War optimism about globalization’s inevitable ‘dismantling of the state’, the state system has 
persisted and in many ways has become more entrenched within global politics. As a result, the 
promise of a new ‘globalism’ has not significantly diminished the standing or political significance of 
the state, which now forces many contemporary cosmopolitans to rethink the role of the state within 
their broader cosmopolitan visions. Second, although moral cosmopolitanism has made a number of 
credible arguments for why we may have duties of justice beyond borders, there is a general lack of 
clarity about how to move moral principles to institutional cosmopolitics. Because of this, 
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cosmopolitans have largely either purposefully left institutional cosmopolitanism operationally 
underdeveloped, preferring to remain in the realm of moral cosmopolitanism, or have developed 
institutional architectures that verge on foundations of world government, which has fuelled 
additional claims by critics that cosmopolitanism is ‘infeasible’ and thus an ‘empty chimera’. Third, 
despite a number of compelling arguments about the existence of a universal humanity within 
cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitans have nevertheless failed to posit a thoroughly persuasive account 
for how ‘humanity’ corresponds to an equally powerful moral motivation. In other words, although 
cosmopolitans have articulated an idea of our shared humanity, they have done so without 
convincingly telling us how this common humanity actually motivates a common human concern, a 
sense of mutual responsibility, and a consistent global political action. In the anti-cosmopolitan 
literature, this is usually referred to as ‘the motivation problem’.  
The aim of this chapter is to try and respond to these deficiencies by exploring the possibility for a 
state-based and potentially more politically motivated form of cosmopolitanism. In doing so, this 
chapter will first reexamine whether a cosmopolitan condition must necessarily derive its normativity 
from an explicit cosmopolitan moral foundation of ‘humanity’ alone, or whether it is also possible to 
locate and consistently promote cosmopolitan motivations that sit between motivated state-interest 
and a movement towards a cosmopolitan condition. It will be argued that the latter is consistent with 
the broadest aims of cosmopolitanism under certain conditions and thus it is possible to envision a 
form of transitional cosmopolitanism that can both speak of cosmopolitan responsibilities while also 
generating the kinds of political motivations often lacking in cosmopolitan appeals to common 
humanity alone. Second, in order to connect theory to practice, the last section of the chapter will 
examine a recent normative and institutional shift in global health policy and the growing recognition 
by powerful states that national health security and the health of those beyond borders are intimately 
linked and co-constituted. By examining these policy developments it will be possible to see a number 
of new institutional initiatives that not only reflect a growing motivation to create what could be 
understood as nascent cosmopolitan responsibilities for global human health, but which are also 
providing tangible motivations and pathways that can put these shared cosmopolitan responsibilities 
into practice.  
The Idea of a Transitional State-Based Cosmopolitanism 
The notion of global justice has deep philosophical roots to cosmopolitan thought and its claims for 
the expansion of moral duties and responsibilities to those beyond state borders. In constructing the 
demands of global justice many contemporary cosmopolitans have traditionally pursued arguments 
that present the state as an arbitrary moral factor in our calculations about the scope of justice (Beitz 
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1975; Barry 1998; Caney 2001; Pogge 2002). In addition, many cosmopolitans have additionally argued 
that traditional notions of state sovereignty have been corroded by globalization, which has in 
significant ways rendered the state both morally and institutionally ‘redundant’ and unable to 
effectively govern independently of, or in response to, globally external factors (Held 1995; Beck 1999; 
Cabrera 2010; Hayden 2005; Habermas 2006; Archibugi 2008; Macdonald 2008). Lastly, cosmopolitans 
often also contend that traditional conceptualizations of the state are inappropriately insular and that 
statist claims for the inherent worth of tightly bounded cultures and national allegiances ignore key 
elements of our common humanity and underplay humanity’s normative significance (Waldron 1999; 
Tan 2004; Nussbaum 2005; Appiah 2006).  
In many ways cosmopolitans have understood the state as more of an inconvenience to work around 
than an empirical background condition that needs to be thoroughly worked into their normative 
thinking. In particular, there seems to be an overall neglect regarding the specific roles states can have 
in promoting a cosmopolitan condition. A part of this neglect is a seeming conflation between moral 
demands about whether states should be the principle actor at the global level, and whether states 
are in fact the principle actor, or more appropriately, that states are a necessary transitional actor 
towards any cosmopolitical condition. Furthermore, by sidestepping the state, it is the case that many 
moral cosmopolitans inadvertently disregard the idea that states could be useful cosmopolitan allies 
(Brown 2011). Yet, this sidestepping amounts to ignoring the state, and in doing so cosmopolitans 
leave themselves open to criticism that cosmopolitanism amounts to nothing more than an ‘empty 
chimera’ and a failure to recognize that any improvement in the international order would necessarily 
have to originate from conditions existing within the current state-based system (Blake 2001; Nagel 
2005; Brown 2009).  
Nevertheless, this ‘removal’ of the state by many contemporary cosmopolitans has not always been 
the case, since there is a rich history of cosmopolitan thinkers who have viewed the state as not being 
antithetical to cosmopolitanism. In fact, most Enlightenment cosmopolitans viewed the state as an 
important component for any cosmopolitan advancement and understood the state as a key 
associational entity for establishing a cosmopolitan condition. Perhaps the most influential in this 
regard is Immanuel Kant, who posited a tripartite legal system of cosmopolitanism that featured states 
as being a key driver for establishing a cosmopolitan condition (Brown 2009). As Kant suggests, a 
cosmopolitan matrix might develop from ‘one powerful and enlightened nation…a republic’ and that 
this could ‘provide a focal point for federal association among other states’ (Kant 1970, 104). Kant 
goes on to suggest that other states could ‘join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of 
each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread 
further and further by a series of alliances of this kind’ (ibid.). According to Kant, the motivation for 
4 
 
joining any alliance is not determined by the ‘motivations of morality’, but motivated on the empirical 
and political realities embedded within global relations (Kant 1970, 114). These empirical dynamics, 
which are rooted within the political and economic structures of the international system, furnish a 
reflectivity that provides the impetus for states, even against their will, towards producing this 
potential ‘concord among men’ (Kant 1970, 108; Brown 2009). As Kant suggests, this reflective logic 
can rely solely on practical realities of mutual interests in trade and security which, if not addressed, 
can ‘provide the occasion for troubles in one place on the globe to be felt all over’ (Kant 1996, 121). It 
is in relation to minimizing the costs of these empirical consequences that Kant believes that ‘the first 
articles of alliance’ will be those associated with trade and security and it is from this impetus that 
greater cosmopolitan state responsibilities are not only motivationally possible, but also empirically 
and normatively necessary. It is because international stability and the health of a state’s civil order 
are inextricably interconnected that Kant suggests, ‘wherever in the world there is a threat…they will 
be motivated to prevent it by mediation’ (Kant 1970, 114).  
What Kant is suggesting is that any state constitution and civil order, no matter how internally 
coherent and stable, cannot be fully secure unless its external relationships with other states are also 
mutually secure and that this can only be done through meaningful political cooperation and the 
acceptance of genuine responsibilities between states. As a result, it is here, in the need to promote 
greater responsibilities between states (so as to secure domestic security) that we can see that Kant 
provides a basis for what might be called transitional cosmopolitanism. As mentioned above, this 
cosmopolitan motivation is not based exclusively on the ‘motivations of morality’ (although moral 
argument is not excluded), but on elements of pragmatic politics and the self-motivation to locate 
order, consistent stability, security, and a condition of right suitable to provide legitimacy criteria so 
as to determine when threats to that condition require coordinated global action.  
In many ways it is possible to understand how the state can be an agent for transitional 
cosmopolitanism. As Lea Ypi contends (2008, 48), political communities like the state can actually 
provide the ‘associative sphere in which cosmopolitanism obtains political agency’. This is because the 
state is able to provide the relevant political, legal, and social mechanisms required to operationalize 
cosmopolitan change (feasibility requirement) as well as the mechanisms that can potentially 
generate a sustained sense of collective identity (stability requirement) that could include obligations 
to those beyond borders. What is indispensable to transitional cosmopolitanism, argues Ypi, is that 
the state is in some meaningful sense characterized by structures of popular sovereignty and civic 
education, which organize, construct and sustain political agency, from which cosmopolitan 
alterations to existing internal and international structures could be generated (ibid.).  
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David Axelsen (2013) agrees, claiming that state policies and societal institutions have an enormous 
influence on how people understand relational conditions of justice as well as their willingness to 
distribute resources. This is because nation-building practices have a huge impact on ‘communal 
imagination’, how people see themselves as members of a community, what values that community 
identifies with as inherent, and how that community sees itself in relation to other communities. Given 
that many anti-cosmopolitans view these aspects of communal relations as foundational for the 
motivation of duties (see the next section), then in terms of feasible capacities for change, the state 
also has significant potential to influence the motivations of their citizens in ways that better factor 
global relational conditions as well as any associated moral considerations and responsibilities. In 
other words, Axelsen nicely illustrates that the cosmopolitan can perfectly accept that communal 
motivations matter, and that states are currently the primary institution able to best influence those 
motivations, while also suggesting that this capacity allows the state to be a tenable resource to 
motivate forms of transitional cosmopolitanism. This is especially so if the state views this as in its 
long-term interest. 
Finally, there is no theoretical reason why states cannot hold instrumental values congruous with 
cosmopolitan principles. This is because, as Simon Caney notes (Caney 2008), states are able to ascribe 
entitlements to human beings as well as shape the political identities of their citizens in ways that are 
inclusive and sensitive to those beyond borders. In addition, states create mechanisms to both 
compensate for, and act against, international violations that are hostile to basic notions of human 
existence. This is not cosmopolitan fantasy, but empirically comprehensible in current political and 
communal life, even if those cosmopolitan values continue to lack consistency and depth. 
What the above discussion suggests is threefold. First, that the state and cosmopolitanism are not 
necessarily incompatible. Second, that states could (and do) represent existing associative structures 
for the grounding and expression of cosmopolitan responsibilities. Third, that there are sound 
arguments to suggest that a state’s interest in securing itself could provide motivations for accepting 
and politically promoting foundational elements of a wider cosmopolitan condition.  
Nevertheless, this raises two questions. One, whether a non-reliance on the ‘motivations of morality’ 
is compatible with cosmopolitanism writ large, and two, what sorts of non-moral motivations could 
persuade states as associative agents of their communities to think more cosmopolitically. It is in the 
next section that the first potential tension will be explored and will ultimately determine that a non-
reliance on moral motivations can be compatible with cosmopolitanism under certain conditions. It 
will be in the third section that one particular political driver of transitional cosmopolitanism is 
identified and discussed.  
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Motivational Force and Cosmopolitan Authenticity 
The moral foundation of cosmopolitanism maintains that we have duties and responsibilities to all 
human beings based solely on our humanity alone, without reference to ethnicity, race, gender, 
culture, nationality, political affiliation, religion, place of birth, geographical location, state citizenship, 
or other communal particularities (Brown and Held 2010, 1). As Catherine Lu suggests (Lu 2000, 245), 
cosmopolitanism represents the ‘acknowledgement of some notion of common humanity that 
translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this 
humanity’. In this regard, cosmopolitanism is deeply rooted in the existence of, and a commitment to, 
a meaningful conception of humanity. It is from this idea of a common humanity that most, if not all, 
cosmopolitans posit an empirical and normative force stemming from our humanity, claiming that it 
can/should motivate our moral duties as well as our political responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the idea of a common humanity is not as unproblematic as many cosmopolitans (and 
non-cosmopolitans) seemingly contend. This is because it is not always exactly clear what is meant 
when cosmopolitans invoke a claim to our common humanity and how this humanity automatically 
motivates the types of duties and responsibilities cosmopolitanism demands. In this regard, an 
overreliance on unquestioned appeals to ‘humanity’ can be seen as part of cosmopolitanism’s 
‘motivational problem’, since the concept of common humanity is not self-evident and can be 
understood in a number of different ways (Gould 2006). As a result, one key to examining the 
motivational problem within cosmopolitanism is to better understand how the concept of common 
humanity is advanced as well as to determine whether or not it alone represents the only appropriate 
way to construct cosmopolitan arguments. As this chapter will argue, although moral arguments 
based on a universal humanity might be one way to generate motivation towards those beyond 
borders, it is not the only way to create cosmopolitan responsibilities and to promote cosmopolitan 
ends transitionally.  
To begin, the most widely employed notion of common humanity within cosmopolitan thought is 
associated with what could be labelled as appeals to humankind. By suggesting a common humanity 
based on humankind, reference is made to species-specific genetic and biological features that are 
evidenced in all human beings and are consistent between all homo sapiens sapiens. As scientific 
evidence has continued to demonstrate, these universal biological features can be both tested and 
verified across the human species, thus giving empirical evidence to cosmopolitan claims that a 
universal human baseline condition exists, from which all human beings share a similarly equal set of 
basic biological needs and interests. Thus, as members of a human species, living in the confines of 
the planet, we are both constrained and interconnected by this reality. As the cosmopolitan advances, 
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because humankind shares a basic set of human characteristics, and since these characteristics are 
essential to human existence, then these characteristics should act as a starting point for our 
normative and political organization, which will logically lead, if taken seriously, to a universal 
recognition of moral duty and political responsibility to all humankind.  
The second widely subscribed understanding of common humanity within cosmopolitanism might be 
understood as appeals to humanness. Here, cosmopolitans often make empirical and normative 
appeals to universal moral and psychological characteristics found across all humans, which make us 
distinctively recognizable as human ‘beings’. These aspects of humanness often include the human 
capacity for advanced reason (Cicero 1991; Las Casas 1992), long-term strategic thinking and the 
ability for moral belief (Aurelius 1983), human capacities for friendship (Seneca 1987), forgiveness 
(Derrida 2002) and mutual contract (Kant 1970, 1996). The cosmopolitan argument then proceeds to 
suggest that because all humans share these defining traits of humanness, these traits represent a 
common human condition, which should be universally recognized, protected, promoted, and 
respected. It is also argued that humans also share common physical and psychological vulnerabilities 
and potentialities to suffer harms that are broadly universal in both type and scope (Pogge 2002). As 
is traditionally argued in both natural law and cosmopolitan thought, these universal capacities or 
characteristics of humanness not only make us members of the same human group empirically, but 
also make us potential members of the same moral community metaphysically (via political 
imagination) and practically (through real interaction) (Cicero 1991; Aurelius 1983; Kant 1970; Vitoria 
1991;etc.). As a result, the cosmopolitan argues that because all humans share these basic capacities, 
and since these basic capacities are witnessed in all human societies, they act as a starting point for 
normative and political organization, which demands legitimated forms of moral duty and political 
responsibility to all human beings based on our humanness.  
Yet another popular cosmopolitan understanding of common humanity builds upon these baseline 
notions of humankind and humanness, while focusing more on the anthropological and sociological 
constructions of human cohabitation and emerging cosmopolitanism(s). Unlike notions of humankind 
and humanness, which understand common humanity from largely physical and psychological 
characteristics, sociological cosmopolitanism makes reference to anthropological and cross-cultural 
commonalities, which demonstrate both natural as well as sociological commonalities. For example, 
many cosmopolitans propose that all human beings organize themselves into broadly consistent social 
and political structures, and that these structures share similar rational elements of moral, legal and 
political order and organization (Waldron 1999). In addition, many cultural cosmopolitans argue that 
cultures themselves are already cosmopolitan, in that they are often an amalgamation of different 
cultural practices, traditions, legal systems, moral beliefs, and political ideas (Waldron 1999; Glenn 
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2013; Benhabib 2004; Brown 2009). Thus, given that universal features of social and cultural life 
exist—and that sociological history demonstrates that cultures are not static entities—then aspects 
of socio-political mutuality across the human spectrum creates the potential for cosmopolitan 
identities and provides enthusiasm for humans to be recognized as potential kosmopolites (citizens of 
the world).  
Although humankind, humanness and a cosmopolitan socio-anthropology provide a number of 
persuasive arguments about why humans share common genetic, biological, physical, psychological, 
sociological, cultural, and political characteristics and properties, it is not always clear exactly how 
knowledge of these properties also produces the sort of motivational compliance required to meet 
the moral and institutional demands of cosmopolitanism. In other words, although cosmopolitanism 
convincingly posits that common human characteristics should/could matter (if we value them as 
universally important), it does not always convincingly tell us that they do matter in practice and thus 
why they act as the kinds of motivational or categorical axioms from which action necessarily follows. 
To put bluntly, it is not clear why having human commonalities matters at all and why those 
commonalities trump the prioritization of other particular values linked to proximity and immediate 
communal interest.  
Despite the fact that responses to these questions are still underdeveloped in cosmopolitan thought, 
it is important not to overplay them. This is because it would be disingenuous to insist that 
cosmopolitans have not made attempts to respond or address these concerns. As those familiar with 
the debate know, many cosmopolitans have attempted to make links between their appeals to 
common humanity and the practical relevance of why this notion of ‘humanity’ is a useful and 
appropriate political and organizational concept. These attempts are not just based on ‘ideal theories’, 
but usually represent a fusion between cosmopolitan moral argument and practical argument, so as 
to illustrate why it is manifestly in everyone’s moral, practical, and political interest to codify important 
human protections within our domestic and global institutions. For example, strong practical 
arguments for the instrumental value of thinking in terms of a common humanity or a world in 
common are particularly salient in cosmopolitan discussions regarding climate change (Caney 2005; 
Held 2010), international security (Beardsworth 2010) and in how to effectively face new threats from 
transborder infectious disease (Brown and Stoeva 2014). Indeed, there is a long tradition of 
pragmatism in cosmopolitan thought for, as Kant famously suggested as far back as 1797, the sphere 
of the earth physically forces humans into an ‘unavoidable coexistence’, providing ‘the occasion for 
troubles in one place on the globe to be felt all over’ (Kant 1996, 121). In other words, Kant suggests 
that if you concur with the former, than it would be both prudent and ethically sensible to organize 
global politics in order to deal with the latter.  
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Nonetheless, it is also clear that appeals to common humanity alone, despite practical merit, have 
seemingly not been strong enough to generate a uniform and consistent motivation to protect, 
further, or respect key aspects of common humanity (Gould 2006, 57). For example, this lack of 
motivational dynamic is currently exemplified in debates about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
This is because although appeals to common humanity are explicitly enumerated in the R2P doctrine, 
as well as widely invoked in political discourse, these arguments have not motivated consistent action 
in regards to R2P implementation, signalling that the R2P might have now become a degenerated of 
stalled global norm (Tacheva and Brown 2015). What this ultimately suggests is that there are 
continued disconnects between the moral aspirations and obligations we assume are embedded in 
the idea of humanity, and the ability of such beliefs to effortlessly translate into the motivation to 
enforce protection practices on behalf of the R2P. While the R2P can be seen to have created new 
normative expectations for states to respond to mass atrocity crimes (see Chapter 1, this volume), its 
ability to address the gap between rhetorical commitment and action remains severely limited. As a 
consequence, it would seem that in many ways appeals to common humanity, although necessary to 
help determine what we ought to do, are not always sufficient for motivating us to actually do it 
(Dobson 2006, 182). 
There have been a number of reasons given for why cosmopolitanism’s invocation of common 
humanity cannot generate the types of motivations required for global practice. These criticisms are 
well rehearsed in the literature and are usually linked to what is broadly referred to as the ‘ideal/non-
ideal’ debate. In essence, the ideal/non-ideal debate is driven by a number of methodological 
concerns about political theory and its ability to connect theory to ‘real world’ practice. On one side, 
ideal theorists are said to be those who model ideal conditions of just societies so that they can act as 
a moral compass from which to reform existing conditions. On the other side, non-ideal theorists 
suggest that this form of theorizing tends to be overly abstract without practicable or real world ideas 
about how to move theory to practice. Non-ideal theorists tend to argue that ideal theories, like 
cosmopolitanism, fail to be fact sensitive, ignoring known feasibility restraints while also failing to 
factor important considerations of probability.  
The fact-sensitivity case made against cosmopolitanism suggests that strong communal solidarities 
are existentially required for the type of motivational force needed to fulfil any meaningful demands 
of justice. As cosmopolitan sceptics argue, people value their membership in bounded communities 
and attach moral significance to communities in such ways that they generate obligations to other co-
nationals that they do not feel towards other human beings (Miller 2005). In addition, it is often 
suggested that it is also simply a fact that different cultures value truths relative to their own 
experiences of culture, which in turn, given the value of community, undermines universal motivations 
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and human prioritizations. In this way the empirical reality of entrenched value pluralism creates a 
condition where politics as an existing communal practice must be seen as being prior to 
(communitarians), or separate from (realists), universal demands of morality. 
In regards to feasibility restraints, many non-ideal theorists argue that humans live in active and 
diverse socio-political communities where disagreement about ‘the good’ often takes place. In 
addition, these communities act as a source of motivational identification for reciprocal obligations. 
As a result, only political solutions that understand these feasibility constraints will suffice in bringing 
about tangible forms of cooperation and social justice. For the non-ideal theorist, it is the day-to-day 
activities of political transaction and existing reciprocities that in the end best motivate people to 
action. As Miller writes (2005, 65), ‘the duties in question must be integral to the relationship, in the 
sense that the relationship could not exist in the form that it does unless the duties were generally 
acknowledged’. Lenard (2010, 348) adds another feasibility constraint, claiming that cosmopolitan 
duties will only be feasible if they can provide a ‘genuinely persuasive account of moral motivation, 
an account that will induce commitment by ordinary people’.  
Additionally, most non-ideal theorists suggest that cosmopolitanism overly relies on complicated 
hypotheticals and abstractions, which ignores the probability of such conditions ever existing. As 
above, it is argued that these theoretical methods often ignore basic facts about human nature, while 
also setting perfect foundational conditions in which unwanted feasibility constraints are neutralized. 
Consequently, it is argued that ideal theory fails to examine the ‘probability’ of that condition ever 
manifesting, rendering cosmopolitanism ‘empty’ (Nagel 2005).  
There are three potential responses that cosmopolitans can give to these critiques. First, the 
cosmopolitan can argue that many of us are in fact trading in a set of fact-sensitive, human empirical 
conditions that require global political solutions. This could be most immediately the case, for example 
regarding transborder infectious disease. This is because the empirical phenomena of communicable 
pathogens threaten all communities and thus place human beings into a common relational condition 
whether they know it or not; or whether or not they are politically motivated to respond to it. In 
addition, although pluralism will deliver science deniers and religious sceptics, there is also a 
significant evidence-base to suggest that denial will not save anyone from Extensively Drug Resistant 
Tuberculosis (XDR-TB) and that coordinated response now would prevent further outbreaks in the 
future. In this case, obsequiousness to value pluralism as the baseline foundation for motivation would 
actually be thoroughly fact-insensitive. This is because the cosmopolitan response recognizes a level 
of pluralism, while also recognizing that global collective action problems like pandemics create a 
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relational condition from which issues of distributive justice arise and from which cosmopolitanism 
could provide one potential response.  
Furthermore, the pluralistic condition of whether or not one is motivated to act against XDR-TB is 
manifest whether one is cosmopolitan or not. Thus, it is not immediately clear why a supposedly more 
‘fact-sensitive’, anti-cosmopolitan position is better placed to deal with value pluralism in this case, 
unless of course, one is content to accept levels of inaction in the face of common and preventable 
threats. The suspicion is, however, that this is not the case for most anti-cosmopolitans, since they 
themselves often insist that political theory should not be devoid of normative judgement or ‘political 
imagination’ and that it can (and should) provide insights on what we ought to do in relation to others 
and why we should be motivated to do it (Miller 2005; Lenard 2010).  
Second, cosmopolitans could further argue that having fact-sensitive practical arguments for 
motivated action can be consistent with a moral conception of a common humanity and that they are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, there is a growing evidence-base suggesting that 
reducing new global pathogenic outbreaks will require better health system strengthening, 
particularly at the point of comprehensive primary care (Kamradt-Scott 2014). There is also wide 
agreement that preventative care is more cost effective than treating diseases once they have become 
epidemics or pandemics (WHO 2015a). In addition, there is also growing consensus that locating, 
monitoring, and containing outbreaks prior to wider system effects enhances general security, both 
locally and globally (WHO 2015b). As is often noted in the literature, it is not surprising that the Ebola 
outbreak originated in the most fragile health systems. As is becoming increasingly understood by all 
states, if you want to control for global pandemics you will have to target and support health system 
strengthening globally, since isolated domestic efforts alone will not be sufficient to prevent the next 
major pandemic. What this illustrates here, and which will be expanded upon below, is that there is a 
link between what is practically necessary as a condition of fact-sensitivity (effective distribution 
mechanisms to strengthen health systems more uniformly) and what moral cosmopolitanism would 
necessarily want to promote anyway (improved medical conditions for more humans globally). 
Moreover, the link between what is practically necessary and what is morally required are closely 
aligned in ways that make cosmopolitan distributive arguments for global burden sharing not only 
feasible, but also, more probable.  
Third, it could also be argued that having practical motivations, as opposed to only ‘authentic’ moral 
motivations, is not antithetical to cosmopolitanism in the short-term. In fact, as stated earlier, there 
is historical precedent within the history of cosmopolitan thought to suggest that practical and fact-
sensitive motivations often underwrote cosmopolitan recommendations. Namely, where pragmatic 
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arguments are utilized to highlight why a cosmopolitan alternative is viable, possible, and potentially 
necessary. For example, there is a practical motivation evident in Cicero’s jurisprudential response to 
the demise of city–state political order and the real need for a form of rule of law that could 
legitimately and effectively govern multifarious communities of empire. Whether or not one agrees 
with the substantive elements of Cicero’s constitution is not the point here. The point is simply that 
Cicero was very much engaged with fact-sensitive political problems associated with his time and 
offered pragmatic constitutional arguments for why this empirical condition demanded inventive new 
forms of political order that could meet certain normative demands of cohabitation, stability, and 
protracted political legitimacy. Consequently, the idea that cosmopolitanism is only ‘authentic’ if it 
posits moral ideals instead of normative principles based on practical politics is historically, 
theoretically, and empirically suspect. This is because it could be argued that practice-based 
motivations are compatible with a form of transitional cosmopolitanism under at least three of the 
following conditions: 
(1) That the outcome of political motivation broadly reflects, in whole or in part, what an ideal 
cosmopolitan moral position would have demanded anyway. As the example above suggests, the case 
of infectious disease control and effective coordinated response to key global vectors could meet 
baseline cosmopolitan reforms regarding the distribution of better and more effective health systems, 
while also satisfying the self-motivated security interests of states. 
(2) That the motivation behind the practical solution could be reasonably interpreted as an iterative 
foundation, which underwrites a nascent cosmopolitan condition, even if that motivation was not 
originally framed as such, and even if the solution only satisfies one aspect of cosmopolitanism writ 
large. The demand that all cosmopolitan criteria must be met simultaneously obviously fails any 
feasibility test, but is also not representative of many of the actual cosmopolitan arguments presented 
in the chapters of this volume. 
(3) That the motivation for political action promotes, in some form, a wider recognition of a common 
human condition that requires moral and/ or political coordination and mutual responsibilities. Here, 
again, the need for global pandemic disease control, common human susceptibility to pathogens, the 
need for vector control, global fact-sensibilities about the relationship between new pathogens and 
fragile health systems—all underwrite the recognition of a common human condition, from which an 
effective relational politics could take account and from which a form of potential cosmopolitics 
emerges. 
In this regard it is possible to locate and consistently promote what might be called transitional 
cosmopolitanism, which sits somewhere between motivated state communal self-interest and 
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iterative advancement towards a potential cosmopolitan condition. As has been argued, this position 
can be consistent with cosmopolitanism writ large under at least three conditions, making it possible 
to envision a form of transitional cosmopolitanism that can reflect a sense of cosmopolitan 
responsibilities while also being cognizant of the kinds of political motivations often lacking in 
cosmopolitan appeals to common humanity alone.  
By thinking in terms of transitional cosmopolitanism it is possible to respond to one final anti-
cosmopolitan argument. As suggested earlier, critics often demand that global solidarities do not exist 
at a sufficient level to fulfil the motivational demands of cosmopolitanism (Miller 2005; Nagel 2005; 
Lenard 2010). Nevertheless, it would be hard to find a cosmopolitan who actually suggests that the 
world is already cosmopolitan in any meaningful moral or political sense. What cosmopolitans argue 
is that there are good moral and political reasons why we should consider cosmopolitan alternatives 
seriously. Moreover, by suggesting that moral motivation can only obtain via existing reciprocal 
relations of community, anti-cosmopolitans paint a rather static image of community, which looks 
historically ‘fact-insensitive’. This is because the rise of state nationalism and emerging international 
solidarities historically required the formation of new identification relationships and the broadening 
of moral and political commitments and communities. Therefore, the problem is that it is not clear 
how this broadening of community would have been possible under these demands. As a result, anti-
cosmopolitans would need to explain how communities have changed and amalgamated historically, 
but in a way that also excludes any possibility for further broadening.  
In response, the transitional cosmopolitanism offered here rejects this static conception of moral and 
political community while fully accepting that identification relationships between peoples, and the 
solidarities that are generated from these relations, are important for creating cosmopolitan 
motivations. As argued above, transitional cosmopolitanism is posited as iterative. Identifying self-
motivated drivers that raise awareness of common human conditions—from current practice or from 
past memories or from threats and mutual gains—act as valuable foundations for a broadening of 
moral cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitics. In this way state communities are not antithetical to 
cosmopolitanism, but act as a key institutional and associative entity capable of promoting new 
cosmopolitan identities and responsibilities. In the first instance these responsibilities will most likely 
be immediate responses to empirically sensitive global relations of mutual concern and cohabitation. 
As suggested earlier by Kant, these baseline relations then have the potentiality to develop into more 




To give empirical weight to the idea of transitional cosmopolitanism, the next section will examine 
several new global trends in the global politics of pandemic control and their relationship to universal 
policies supporting health system strengthening. This area of global governance has been selected 
because it represents ongoing normative and institutional shifts in global health policy that reflect a 
state-based motivated recognition that national health security and the health of those beyond 
borders, are intimately linked and mutually reinforcing. Thus, by examining these policy developments 
it is possible to see initiatives that not only reflect a growing motivation to create what might be 
understood as a cosmopolitan responsibility for basic global human health, but which are also 
providing both feasible and fact-sensitive motivations and institutional pathways that advance 
nascent cosmopolitan responsibilities in global practice. 
Fragile States, Pandemics and Feasibility Drivers for Cosmopolitan Health 
The prior section suggested that practical and self-interested motivations are consistent with 
cosmopolitan aims if: (1) They produce, in part or in whole, outcomes that reflect ideal cosmopolitan 
moral principles; (2) They could be reasonably interpreted as an iteration towards a nascent 
cosmopolitan condition; and (3) They promote a wider recognition of a common human condition that 
requires moral and/or political coordination.  
As an empirical example, the post-Ebola global political landscape represents an interesting normative 
shift in global health policy that could arguably illustrate a form of transitional cosmopolitanism. As 
G7 leaders at the 2015 Summit in Germany proclaimed, ‘the Ebola epidemic was a wake-up call for all 
of us’. This statement, jointly made by Angela Merkel, Barack Obama, and David Cameron, reflects a 
growing concern by developed countries about the global capacity to respond effectively to the next 
global outbreak (Brown 2015). This concern stems from the fact that the Ebola epidemic quickly killed 
over 11,000 people, infected over 27,000, and led to the widespread recognition by the health 
community that global health governance was ill prepared to fight pandemics. As part of this 
normative shift there has been explicit recognition that many threatening diseases like Ebola are the 
result of fragile state structures and inadequate health system strengthening, which result in the 
inability to monitor and control destructive disease vectors. 
In arguing their case, many key leaders in the West and elsewhere have started to use the language 
of ‘common responsibility’ in order to justify their health interventions within these fragile states. This 
language and practice of responsibility has been particularly evident when states were unable to 
respond to emerging epidemics. In addition, there has been a series of explicit policy links made 
between national security and global health security, which have resulted in calls for a greater 
responsibility to devise long-term security strategies both domestically and internationally. Although 
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the employment of this ‘common responsibility’ rhetoric can still be framed as part of an overly narrow 
discourse concerning the ‘securitization of health’, there is nonetheless an interesting connection 
emerging between the language of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the acceptance of 
responsibility for global health. This is both theoretically, in terms of when a manifest health failure 
triggers coordinated humanitarian response, as well as in legal practice, where debates about Ebola 
mirrored earlier attempts by France and others to implement the R2P in context of the unfolding 
humanitarian catastrophe caused by cyclone Nargis in Burma. Lastly, there is a growing recognition 
that epidemiological factors create situations where ‘resilient’ security requires longterm global 
health solutions, which seemingly has created a sense of empirical necessity that is triggering nascent 
cosmopolitan global reforms driven by security-conscious states. 
As part of this new post-Ebola ‘call to arms’, two new global financing mechanisms have been 
introduced to support global health emergency responses. These are the WHO’s Contingency Fund for 
Emergencies (CFE) and the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Facility (PEF). In essence, the CFE was 
the bi-product of continued discussions around the International Health Regulations (IHRs) and was 
adopted at the Sixty-Eighth World Health Assembly. As part of a more coordinated global emergency 
response strategy, the CFE aims to fill the gap between the first 72 hours of a declared health 
emergency and the time at which resources from other financing mechanisms begin to flow. The CFE 
covers all countries regardless of income in order to prevent an infectious disease from escalating into 
a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), as defined in the IHRs, as well as to 
respond to other Grade 3 events with substantial public health consequences, whether disease related 
or not. The fund is triggered by national request and the level of funding is decided on a case-by-case 
basis (from a US$100 million fund), which can include funding for personnel, information technology 
and information systems, medical supplies, and field and local government support. Since its creation 
in 2015, the CFE has disbursed US$8.5 million for a range of interventions related to the Zika virus in 
South America, Yellow Fever in central Africa, and drought-related food Insecurity in Asia. 
Correspondingly, the PEF was established after the final 2015 G7 Communiqué in Germany and is 
currently in its final design phase at the World Bank, with an expected launch at the beginning of 2017. 
The PEF was proposed by the G7 asan insurance mechanism that seeks to support and follow up 
measures in  emergencies after initial CFE funds have been mobilized. It aims to do this by providing 
a surge of post-CFE funding for response efforts to prevent infectious disease outbreaks from 
becoming costly pandemics with a high global death toll. It notes, for example, epidemic risks from 
new orthomyxoviruses (new influenza pandemic virus A, B, and C), coronaviridae (SARS, MERS), 
filoviridae (Ebola, Marburg), and other zoonotic diseases (Crimean Congo, Rift Valley, Lassa fever). The 
total level of funding for the PEF is estimated to be up to US$500 million per outbreak.  
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In many ways, this financial mechanism signals a significant response by state powers to the 
immediate failures associated with Ebola while also representing what might be understood as a 
potentially nascent cosmopolitan iteration towards a more globally uniform and equitable health 
policy. For example, the PEF will be financed through two delivery ‘windows’ initially underwritten by 
G7 countries: an insurance mechanism for funds up to US$500 million, and an immediate cash 
injection between US$50 and US$100 million. In creating an insurance mechanism, the G7 and World 
Bank have suggested that the PEF will create a new market for pandemic insurance that will bring 
‘greater discipline and rigor to pandemic preparedness and incentivize better pandemic response 
planning’. In addition, the World Bank anticipates Sustainable Development Goal 3.8 (universal health 
coverage—see below) enhancement since it is foreseen that the PEF will ‘stimulate efforts by 
countries and development partners to build better core public health capabilities for disease 
surveillance and health systems strengthening, toward universal health coverage’ (World Bank 2016). 
Prima facie, this statement does suggest that the PEF links to more long-term health systems and 
capacity strategies, thus signalling a potentially robust move towards a broader cosmopolitan position 
focusing on basic human health.  
In terms of cosmopolitan policy narratives, one innovation associated with the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) is that it situates all global development activities within its seventeen 
development goals and 169 targets. This unifying element is enhanced by the recent adoption of SDG 
3.8, which enumerates universal health coverage (UHC) as the primary global organizational norm. 
The norm is defined as the objective that ‘all people can use the promotive,   preventative, curative, 
rehabilitative and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also 
ensuring that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship’ (WHO 2015c). 
At least in spirit, the language of SDG 3.8 clearly captures movement towards the cosmopolitan ideals 
of universal care and equitable burden sharing in the distribution of health services.  
It is too soon to determine the positive effects of the SDGs on global health policy and its satisfaction 
of cosmopolitan principles. Nevertheless, there are a number of positive signs suggesting that the 
SDGs, and in particular UHC, meet the conditions of transitional cosmopolitanism outlined above. 
First, there is agreed recognition about the past failures of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and there has been an upsurge in political motivation not to repeat past mistakes. Second, there is 
significant evidence suggesting that a majority of countries are already incorporating the SDGs into 
their national health strategies, which illustrates that the SDGs are already delivering some of their 
planned coordinative and potential cosmopolitical effects. Third, although the SDGs are clearly overly 
ambitious in terms of scope, they do help to sharpen development aims by framing them against 169 
measurable targets. As part of this performance-based model, it will be easier to track progress, locate 
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policy and resource gaps, and to demand accountability in cases of noncompliance (for both 
developed and developing countries). Fourth, the SDGs— and particularity UHC—has been diffused 
and adopted by the major powers and key institutions as a master concept and norm. For example, 
UHC has been explicitly stated as the guiding norm in global health development by key institutions 
such as the G7, G20, G77, the World Bank, the GFATM, the GAVI Alliance, PETFAR, the New 
Development Bank, the BRICS, the European Union, USAID, the African Union, ASEAN, all UN agencies, 
BMGF, and many more. Fifth, the link between the SDGs, UHC and health system strengthening is 
being driven by key powerful states as well as by nearly all developing countries. This starts to address 
a main motivational failure of the MDGs, but also sharpens long-term health development aims in line 
with many cosmopolitan principles of global justice, namely, to end development aid dependency 
cycles and system underperformance. In this respect, there are promising signs that commitments to 
the SDGs signal important cosmopolitan iterations towards the recognition of a mutual self-interest 
in global health, as well as the acceptance of a common human condition.  
In this light, and in connection to the criteria for transitional cosmopolitanism, perhaps the most 
significant cosmopolitan iteration relates to the G7’s recent recognition of the importance of UHC and 
its link to health system strengthening. What is most promising is the fact that the G7 positioned UHC 
as the overarching normative and policy framework in global health. This was done by bringing key 
global health initiatives under the umbrella of UHC as a master concept. For example, the G7 
positioned the work of both the WHO and the World Bank as essential representatives of a UHC 
approach to health. In doing so, the G7 also listed key new initiatives, such as the Global Financial 
Facility, as needing to fit into this overall UHC framework. What is perhaps most promising in terms of 
global health effectiveness is the fact that the G7 has also linked the Global Health Security Agenda to 
a health systems strengthening approach, which stresses a long-term global health strategy from the 
ground up and affirms that global security and building strengthened health systems are thoroughly 
co-constituted (Brown and Stoeva 2014). As the official G7 Leader’s Summit Declaration states: 
We reiterate our commitment to enhance our support and coordination to strengthen health systems, 
especially in developing countries, to make them more resilient, inclusive, affordable, sustainable, and 
equitable. To this end, we emphasize the need for a strengthened international framework to 
coordinate the efforts and expertise of all relevant stakeholders…we support the establishment of 
UHC 2030 that seeks to ensure the International Health Partnership principles…and to promote and 




The implications of this position on UHC are potentially dramatic from a cosmopolitan standpoint. 
First, by presenting UHC as a master concept in global health, the G7 has effectively signalled their 
‘buy-in’ to SDG 3, as well as to its most ambitious target of UHC. Second, by doing so, the G7 endorsed 
the UHC 2030 Alliance, which seeks to create a political and coordinated forum that can deliver on 
SDG 3.8 equally between all states. Third, the emphasis placed on ‘country-led health system 
strengthening’ as a means to effectively deliver UHC is important to note. Although it is too early to 
tell, G7 commitments could represent the kind of normative shift that many global health experts 
have been demanding is needed to reduce pandemics as well as provide more equitable health to 
human populations. Finally, it is necessary to underscore the significance of linking health system 
strengthening to long-term health security, since a failure to do so in the past has often been a source 
of criticism (Rushton 2011; Brown and Stoeva 2014) and seemingly signals a series of new self-
interested, yet also globally minded, cosmopolitan responsibilities. 
Conclusion: Cosmopolitan Motivation and the Health of Others 
This chapter has explored the idea of a state-based and potentially more politically motivated form of 
transitional cosmopolitanism. In doing so it was argued that state-based self-interest is compatible 
with cosmopolitanism if those motivations: (1) produce, in part or in whole, outcomes that reflect 
ideal cosmopolitan moral principles; (2) could reasonably be interpreted as an iteration towards a 
nascent cosmopolitan condition; and (3) promote a wider recognition of a common human condition 
that requires moral and/or political coordination. It was additionally argued that the satisfaction of 
these conditions represents a normative consistency with cosmopolitanism that operates without 
explicit moral appeals to our ‘humanity’ alone.  
In order to demonstrate a potential form of transitional cosmopolitanism in practice, the chapter also 
appraised recent normative and institutional shifts in global health policy, highlighting a growing 
recognition by powerful states that national health security and the health of those beyond borders 
are intimately linked and co-constituted. By examining policy developments around pandemic control, 
it is possible to see a growing political motivation to create what could be understood as cosmopolitan 
responsibilities for global human health, but  which also represent existing fact-sensitive and politically 
feasible motivations and pathways that can put these shared responsibilities into practice.  
Although how these new policies play out will in many respects determine how well they ultimately 
satisfy cosmopolitan aims, these recent policy drivers do offer enthusiasm to the idea that they 
represent nascent expressions of cosmopolitan responsibilities for the health of those beyond 
borders. Furthermore, by reflecting upon cosmopolitanism in more transitional terms, this chapter 
has attempted to provide a useful heuristic for thinking progressively about state-based 
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cosmopolitanism that might also be useful in examining other global policy sectors. Lastly, assuming 
the world may require more rather than less cosmopolitics in the future, then rethinking 
cosmopolitanism in light of motivational drivers helps to reassess new factsensitive determinants for 
common response to issues that genuinely threaten not only the security of individual states, but 
threaten all of humanity. All of which suggests that cosmopolitan human progress could be fostered 
without also having to make appeals to the ‘motivations of morality’ alone. 
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